Economic Effects of a Potential Foodborne Disease: Potential Relationship between Mycobacterium Avium Subs. Paratuberculosis (MAP) in Dairy and Crohn’s in Humans by Chiu, Leslie J. Verteramo et al.
 
 











Economic Effects of a Potential Foodborne Disease: 
Potential Relationship between Mycobacterium Avium 
Subs. Paratuberculosis (MAP) in Dairy and Crohn’s in 
Humans 
Leslie J. Verteramo Chiu1, Loren W. Tauer2, Rebecca L. Smith3, and Yrjo T. 
Grohn4 
1College of Veterinary Medicine and Charles H. Dyson School of Applied Economics and Management, Cornell University 
2Charles H. Dyson School of Applied Economics and Management, College of Agriculture and Life Sciences, and SC Johnson School of 
Business, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, 14853 
3Department of Pathobiology, College of Veterinary Medicine, University of Illinois, Urbana, IL, 61802 
4Section of Epidemiology, College of Veterinary Medicine, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853 
ljv9@cornell.edu; lwt1@cornell.edu; rlsdvm@illinois.edu; ytg1@cornell.edu 
 
Received March 2020, accepted October 2020, available online November 2020 
 
ABSTRACT 
Welfare costs of a potential food shock were estimated by disseminating information to milk drinkers on the 
prevalence of Mycobacterium avium sub. paratuberculosis  (MAP) in the U.S. milk supply, its potential linkage to 
Crohn’s disease in humans, and subsequent  government intervention to minimize MAP in the milk supply. We found 
that 19.6% of milk consumers exposed to MAP information would stop milk consumption at current market prices, 
and that only 5% of those would return to their original milk consumption levels after the government intervention. 
Societal costs of the food shock after the intervention were estimated at $18.2 billion.  
Keywords: Food Shock; Crohn’s Disease; Food Contamination; Milk Demand; Food Scare.  
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1 Introduction 
Foodborne diseases spreading through a country’s food supply chain pose serious public health risks. It is 
estimated that more than 100,000 people are hospitalized and about 3,000 people die in the U.S. from 
foodborne diseases each year (Center for Disease Control and Prevention, 2018). In the European Region, 
it is estimated that foodborne diseases cause about 5,000 people deaths per year and that more than 
400,000 disability-adjusted life years (WHO, 2017). Foodborne diseases also occur economic costs from 
treatment and controlling the disease, and from industry losses due to decrease in demand of the 
infected food.  
Foodborne diseases of livestock origin can originate from infected production animals or their infected 
environment. Examples of such foodborne pathogens include bovine tuberculosis, trichinosis, salmonella, 
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE), and E. coli. 
One potential foodborne pathogen that has not received as much public attention as other foodborne 
pathogens is (MAP). MAP is the agent causing Johne’s disease in ruminants. Johne’s disease is a chronic 
disease that affects the lower intestines of ruminants, resulting in wasting, milk loss, and eventually 
death. It is estimated that about 68% of all U.S. dairy herds are affected by MAP, while la rge U.S. dairy 
operations have a herd prevalence of about 95% (USDA:APHIS:VS, 2008). MAP can be present in the milk 
produced by infected cows, but there are few studies estimating the prevalence of MAP in raw milk and 
commercially pasteurized milk, and their results vary significantly. It is estimated that up to 27.5% and 
about 8% of the raw milk produced in the U.S. (Jayarao et al., 2004) and U.K. (Grant et al., 2002), 
respectively, test positive to MAP with PCR. Ellingson et al., (2005) estimated that about 3% of retail 
pasteurized milk samples in three states of the U.S. (CA, MN, and WI) tested positive to MAP with PCR. 
Millar et al., (1996) estimated that about 28% of the whole pasteurized milk sampled in England tested 
culture positive, and Grant et al., (2002) estimated that about 12% of commercially pasteurized milk in 
the U.K. tested PCR positive. MAP has also been detected in powder infant formula produced in some 
European countries (Botsaris et al., 2016). Commercial pasteurization may not eliminate MAP completely  
from milk (Chiodini and Hermon-Taylor, 1993;Grant et al., 2002; O’Reilly et al., 2004). MAP has been 
identified in milk ultra-pasteurized at high temperature (Paolicchi et al., 2012). Donaghy et al., (2004) 
found that MAP can persist in the cheddar cheese manufacturing processes. Even milk produced from 
subclinically infected cows can contain MAP (Ayele et al, 2005). 
A similar disease in humans is Crohn’s disease (CD), for which the cause(s) are unknown. Crohn’s disease 
is a chronic disease that causes inflammation of the small and sect ions of the large intestines. Abdominal 
pain, diarrhea, and weight loss are common symptoms of CD. Although Crohn’s disease is not a terminal 
disease, it cannot be cured, and results in permanent lifestyle changes. MAP has been identified in CD 
patients; however, the causal link between drinking MAP contaminated milk and CD has not been widely 
accepted (Feller et al., 2007). In a meta-analysis of MAP and CD, Feller et al. (2007) found that the causal 
link between MAP and CD is inconclusive (cannot be rejected nor accepted given the evidence). They 
conclude that any knowledge on association should be updated as new evidences accumulate. Recently, 
Bognár et al. (2019) discussed the potential routes of transmission, including  the food chain, of MAP to 
humans, and concluded that herd level control programs should be implemented to minimize MAP 
infection and the potential zoonotic risk.     
Consequently, the objective of this paper was to analyze the economic effects of a potent ial food shock 
caused by milk consumers’ awareness of MAP in milk, and of a subsequent implementation of a 
government MAP elimination program. We estimated changes in milk demand and its corresponding 
welfare changes using a partial equilibrium framework, the cost to eliminate MAP from the milk supply, 
milk supply changes due to implementing a MAP elimination program, and the likelihood of restoring 
consumer demand to the initial level. To estimate the effect of information on MAP in the milk supply, we 
conducted a difference-in-difference analysis from an online survey of milk consumers representative of 
the U.S. population. We also collected personal information on these consumers and analyzed factors 
that contribute to their response of MAP information in milk and to a MAP elimination program. 
The results of this paper have important policy implications and contributes to the debate in 
understanding the potential costs of a food shock of a foodborne pathogen present in the food supply, 
and the ability to restore consumers’ confidence in the food supply. Our study centers on the 
dissemination of information of a potential zoonotic pathogen in the food supply, where the presence of 
the pathogen has been known to the scientific community but has been largely unknown to the rest of 
the population. Our results can help policy makers in deciding the scope of the intervention, based on the 
expected costs of the shock. 
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2 Literature Review 
Studies on the effects of food shocks on consumer behavior are numerous. Smith  et al. (1999) estimated 
that the bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) scare of 1996 in Scotland reduced consumer trust in 
information from expert sources, including the government, about food safety. Kaiser, Scherer, and 
Barbano (1992) analyzed the potential response of consumers to milk produced with recombinant bovine 
somatotropin (r-bST) hormone in the U.S., and found that about 18% of milk consumers would decrease 
milk consumption if r-bST was used in the production of the milk they purchase, even though bST is a 
naturally occurring hormone in cows. Estimates of the effect of a hypothetical Salmonella food sc are on 
chicken demand were conducted in five European countries by Mazzocchi et al. (2008), they found that 
consumer trust is important in estimating the effect of the food scare, thereby suggesting that priority 
should be on building trust after a food scare.   
Some studies on food shocks include the implementation of government programs, such as culling 
infected animals, quarantine, or total depopulation of a country’s livestock. Examples include the 
outbreak of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE or mad cow disease) in the U.K. decreased beef 
consumption in Europe in that same year by 11% (Powell, 2001), costing the U.K. more than £4 billion.  
Changes in consumer demand from a food shock can occur quickly. From the start of the BSE outbreak in 
Japan in September 2001 to the end of November 2001, sales of domestic and imported beef dropped by 
70%, even though only three cases of BSE were confirmed  (McCluskey et al., 2005). These authors found 
that Japanese consumers were willing to pay up to 50% premium for BSE-tested beef. 
Consumer reaction to food shocks depends on many factors, including risk communication of the 
pathogen or the agent perceived to be harmful, and individual characteristics (Mazzocchi et al., 2008). In 
a study of risk perception of avian influenza on Chinese consumers, Zhou et al. (2016) found that 
providing any information on the pathogen (H7N9 virus), either positively or negatively, led to an 
increased perception of risk and lower consumption of chicken, suggesting low trust in positive 
information. Trust in authorities moderates the impact of the food shock, while high education amplifies 
the effect of trust (Lobb, Mazzocchi, and Traill, 2007). Piggott and Marsh (2004) found that poultry is 
more responsive to safety concerns than beef or pork.  
This paper is different from most papers on food shocks. While most papers studied consumers’ reaction 
to a pathogen, or to a risk factor, that is introduced in a food product, this paper studies consumers’ 
reaction to bacteria that is already present in the milk supply. In this paper, consumers are given 
information about the presence of the bacteria and the potential, not confirmed, link to C rohn’s disease.  
3 Methodology 
3.1 Survey 
The data used in this analysis were collected through an online survey on a random  sample of 604 milk 
drinkers across the U.S.1 
Survey participants were randomly assigned to three mutually exclusive groups: control -control (CC), 
treatment-control (TC), and treatment-treatment (TT). Each of these groups had a version of the survey 
with different information on MAP. The survey included two interventions, I1 and I2. Each intervention 
provided unique information to participants. After the intervention information was presented, 
participants were asked a willingness to purchase (WTP) question. This question asked participants 
whether they would continue to buy the same amount of milk they normally buy or reduce their 
purchase. The answer to the WTP question was a dichotomous yes/no choice.  
Details on the survey questions are found in the appendix. 
                                                 
1 Sample subjects were aged 21 years old and older, who participate in their household’s milk purchasing decisions. The 
survey was created and distributed to a random sample using the online survey platform Qualtrics® between Oct. 2nd and 
15th, 2018. The survey included standard demographic questions, questions validated to capture level of trust in 
institutions and level of risk aversion, and additional questions to gauge familiarity with CD, and experience with food 
borne epidemics. 
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3.2 Analysis 
The effect of MAP information on consumers’ willingness to purchase milk, and the restoration of 
consumption with government intervention to reduce the incidence of MAP in milk production were 
estimated using difference-in-difference (DID) analysis. There is no initial difference between treatment 
and control groups pre-intervention.  
A detailed explanation on the model used in the analysis is found in the appendix.  
3.3 Economic Welfare 
The economic impact on society caused by a MAP food shock was analyzed in two parts. First, we 
estimated the welfare effect of the decrease in demand for fluid milk caused by consumers’ reaction to 
MAP milk. Next, we estimated the costs of government strategies to eliminate MAP from the milk supply 
and restore consumer confidence and the effect in restoring consumer demand. Changes in supply 
caused by government controls were also estimated. 
The change in milk demand was estimated from the survey by the number of people that responded that 
they will not purchase the same amount of milk at current prices after reading the information on MAP in 
fluid milk. We assumed that respondents will not buy any amount of milk. Although it is possible that 
consumers may partially decrease the consumption of a product that poses a hazard to their health, it is 
difficult to estimate a reliable decrease in consumption from surveys. We estimated the change in total 
milk demand as a parallel shift of the demand curve for fluid milk. Consumer and producer surpluses 
were estimated for each equilibrium price after each intervention.  
Similar to Lhermie et al. (2018), P0 was calculated as the average U.S. national fluid milk price for a five 
year period. We used the period from 2014-2018. Q0 was the average yearly U.S. milk production over 
the same years (USDA:ERS, 2020a).  
The price elasticity of demand, ED, and price elasticity of supply, ES, were obtained from Andreyeva et 
al. (2010), and Bozic et al. (2012), respectively. We used linear supply and demand functions 
, and  
The elasticities used are assumed to hold at equilibrium price, , and quantity, , from the formula   
 where , , , and  were estimated from the elasticity values and the equilibrium price 
and quantity.  
Values of the parameters used to estimate welfare changes are shown in Table A1 in the appendix. 
The formulas to estimate consumer and producer welfare changes are presented after Table A1 in the 
appendix.  
The response of consumers to a government program to reduce MAP was measured as the effect of the 
second treatment in the survey. In this analysis we consider a national program of herd testing, and those 
herds that test MAP positive would be required to implement a MAP elimination protocol to reduce MAP 
prevalence to safe levels. Studies that estimate the efficacy of MAP test and cull protocols in infected 
herds conclude that it is very difficult to completely eliminate MAP from an infected herd (Lu et al., 2010; 
Mitchell et al., 2008; Smith et al., 2017; Verteramo Chiu et al., 2018) . However, some test and cull 
protocols can reduce the prevalence of MAP positive animals in a herd to 3% (from a prevalence of 12%) 
(Verteramo Chiu et al., 2018). This reduction in prevalence has been shown to be sufficient to decrease 
the amount of MAP in milk to undetectable levels. Beaver et al. (2017) found no traces of MAP in the milk 
produced in a dairy herd with 2.9% MAP prevalence. Khol et al. (2013) found that in a herd with 5% MAP 
seroprevalence, no MAP was detected in bulk milk tanks. Milk produced from a dairy herd with 3% MAP 
seroprevalence is unlikely to have detectable levels of MAP.  
A government intervention to eliminate or reduce MAP prevalence from the milk supply chain to safe 
levels would decrease the supply of fluid milk in the U.S. No international milk trade is assumed when the 
government program is in place. Milk supply may return to its pre-MAP control levels after cow 
repopulation; however, we do not analyze the dynamics of milk supply and demand. We focus on the 
comparative statics of the change in demand and supply.  
The estimation of the change in supply after the government intervention follows the analysis by 
Verteramo Chiu et al., (2018). The authors found that testing and culling all cows in an endemically MAP 
infected herd, starting in their first parity and higher, can reduce MAP prevalence, from the U.S. 
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estimated endemic prevalence of 12% to 3%. The tests used in MAP controls do not have perfect 
sensitivity2, leading to undetected MAP positive animals left in the herd. We assumed that the 
government intervention to control MAP is testing and culling all cows parity one and higher. The costs 
associated with implementing this intervention were obtained from Verteramo Chiu et al., (2018).  
The change in milk supply resulting from implementing the MAP control strategy was estimated from loss 
in milk production from the culled cows that tested MAP positive. For the period 2014-2018, the average 
number of dairy cows in the U.S. is estimated at 9.34 million (USDA:ERS, 2020b), and the average annual 
milk production per cow in the U.S. is 10,295 kg (USDA:ERS, 2020b). From the milk production analysis by 
Smith et al., (2016), we estimated the milk production from an average MAP infected cow to be about 
8.5% lower than the production of an average cow in the U.S. The shift in supply of milk due to the 
control strategy is the product of the expected number of cows with MAP (1.121 million) times its 
expected milk production per year (9,420 kg). The estimated change in supply is 10.6 billion kg of milk, or 
11% of the U.S. annual production. 
The total welfare change was calculated after the government intervention to reduce MAP in the milk 
supply. 
The hypotheses tested are presented in the appendix.  
4 Results 
Five sets of results are presented: demographic composition of the survey participants, Differen ce-in-
Difference results of the treatment effects, factors affecting the first and second treatment, and welfare 
analysis. 
4.1 Demographic Summary 
The results of the demographic characteristics of the survey participants, by group and total, are shown 
in Table A2 in the appendix. 
The distribution of demographic values between groups TC and TT are similar. Group CC has a lower 
proportion of male participants (26%) compared to groups TC (64%) and TT (61%). We tested for gender 
effects and WTP responses at the first intervention in the CC group and found no significant effect, with a 
p-value of 0.25. The demographic characteristics of our sample, although not identical to the national 
average, provide external validity. The effect of some demographic factors on the treatment effect were 
also tested and the results are shown in the subsections that follow.  
4.2 DID results 
The results of the logistic regression on the DID effects are presented in Table 1. The variables T1 and T2 
are indicators of the first and second treatment, respectively. In this paper we define treatment as the 
time when information is given to the individual followed by the WTP question. The information in the 
treatment can be neutral (for the control group), or not (interventions for the tre ated groups). GT1 and 
GT2 are the interaction effects of the treated groups and T1 and T2, respectively, and represent the 
effects of the two interventions on WTP. 
The marginal effect of GT1 on WTP milk is 0.196, indicating that the first treatment (MAP information in 
the milk supply) would result in 19.6% of milk drinkers reducing their milk purchases. This is the 
proportion of the milk consumers that respond negatively to the first treatment. Because this parameter 
is positive and statistically significant, Hypothesis 1 (H1) is rejected in favor of the null. The effect of the 
second treatment, GT2, captures the efficacy of government interventions to restore confidence in milk 
consumers. Its value represents the percentage of milk consumers that decreased milk purchases in GT1 
that would continue consuming their normal amount of milk if the intervention takes place. The 
coefficient value of the marginal effect of GT2 is -0.053. The negative sign indicates that on average, 5.3% 
of the people responding negatively to GT1 would restore their milk purchases to their pre-GT1 level. This 
is equivalent to 1.04% of equilibrium quantity of the initial state (pre-treatment). Although the sign is 
what we would expect (-0.053), the results are not statistically significant at the 5% level. Our results 
cannot reject Hypothesis 2.  
                                                 
2 Sensitivity for fecal culture test is 0.90 for clinically infected animals (Collins et al., 2006), and 0.50 for subclinically 
infected animals with MAP (Whitlock et al., 2000). Specificity of fecal culture test is 1 (Sweeney et al., 2014). 
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Table 1. 
Logistic regression results of the DID effects and their marginal effects. 
Variable Log Odds Ratio Marginal Effect 
T1 -1.869*** -0.339*** 
 (0.207)  
GT1 1.085***  0.196*** 
 (0.233)  
T2 -1.046*** -0.189*** 
 (0.161)  
GT2 -0.291 -0.053 
 (0.237)  
Standard errors in parenthesis. Significance: *** .01, ** .05, * .10. Marginal effects are estimated at 
mean values and represent changes in probability of decreasing milks purchases. T1, first treatment;  
T2, second treatment; GT1, treated on the first treatment; GT2, treated on the second treatment. 
 
We estimated another logistic regression similar to that described in Table 1, but included demographic 
variables interacting with each of the treatment groups. The results are shown in Table 2.  
Table 2. 
Log-odds ratio and marginal effects of demographic variables for the treatment effects on the treated. 
Variable Log Odds Ratio Marginal Effect 
T1 -1.869*** -0.332 
 (0.207)  
GT1 2.647*** 0.470 
 (0.552)  
GT1xMale -1.019*** -0.181 
 (0.246)  
GT1xAge -0.020** -0.004 
 (0.009)  
GT1xHSchool -0.233 -0.041 
 (0.250)  
GT1xLowIncome 0.413* 0.073 
 (0.236)  
GT1xYoung -0.473* -0.084 
 (0.261)  
GT1xPCMilkCons 0.065 0.011 
 (0.138)  
T2 -1.046*** -0.186 
 (0.161)  
GT2 1.153 0.205 
 (0.813)  
GT2xMale -0.973** -0.173 
 (0.391)  
GT2xAge -0.023 -0.004 
 (0.014)  
GT2xHSchool -0.062 -0.011 
 (0.386)  
GT2xLowIncome 0.363 0.064 
 (0.375)  
GT1xYoung -0.570 -0.101 
 (0.404)  
GT1xPCMilkCons 0.267 0.047 
 (0.200)  
Standard errors in parenthesis. Significance: *** .01, ** .05, * .10. Marginal effects were estimated at the mean values and 
represent changes in probability of decreasing milks purchases. T1, first treatment; T2, second treatment; GT1, treated on the 
first treatment; GT2, treated on the second treatment. Interaction terms Male, indicator if male; Age, age in years; HSchool, 
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maximum level of studies is high school or less; LowIncome, annual household income is $50,000 or less; Young, indicator if 
people age 18 or younger live in the household; PCMilkCons, per capita milk consumption, truncated at 4 gal/week. 
 
Males are more likely to be unresponsive to treatment 1 than females. This is consistent with previous 
studies on risk attitudes (Tonsor et al., 2009). Similarly, older people and people living in households with 
people age 18 and under, are also less likely to reduce milk purchases because of the MAP information on 
milk. Households with low income (  $50,000) are more likely to decrease milk purchases due to 
treatment 1. Demographic variables are less important for the second treatment. Only gender is 
statistically significant on responding to the second treatment (government controls to eliminate MAP 
from the milk supply). Males are more likely to restore their milk purchases once the control is in effect. 
Older people are also more likely to restore their milk purchases after treatment 2, however, the result is 
marginally significant. Milk consumption has no significant effect in either treatment.  
4.3 Factors affecting the first treatment 
The following sets of results are the effects of various factors on the likelihood of decreasing WTP milk 
from the first treatment on the treated. We tested the rest of the hypotheses by includ ing the variables 
described in the hypotheses section in the logistic regression model that estimates the DID effects. For 
each hypothesis tested, the corresponding variables used to test that hypothesis were interacted with a 
treatment dummy on the treated. Each hypothesis was tested independently from the rest. 
To test hypothesis 3, we included a variable that measures whether a person trusts news from 
newspapers, TV, radio, or internet. The value of the variable is 1 if the person trusts any of these 
information sources. Trust among these sources is highly correlated (> 0.8). An additional variable 
included trust of government. Both variables have negative marginal effects ( -0.014 and -0.018, for trust 
of government and trust in news sources, respectively) but are not statistically significant (p-values > 
0.64). 
Hypothesis 4 tests the preference for milk production and the effect of decreasing WTP milk due to MAP 
information. We tested the preferences for locally produced milk and organic milk. Additionall y, we 
tested if consumer’s agreement that pasteurization is important to have healthy milk influences 
treatment 1.  For each of these three statements, we created a binomial variable of value 1 if the 
individual strongly agrees or somewhat agrees to the following statements: I prefer milk from local farms, 
I prefer organic milk, pasteurization is important to have healthy milk.  
Preference for milk from local farms does not have a significant effect in treatment 1. Knowing that 
pasteurization is important for healthy milk has a negative effect in treatment 1 (marginal effect -0.08, 
with a p-value of 0.10). These people are 8% more likely to continue drinking the same amount of milk 
despite the information of MAP in milk, than the people who do not think pasteurization is important for 
healthy milk. Consumers that prefer organic milk, however, are more likely to reduce purchases of milk 
because of the information on MAP in milk. These people are 25% more likely to reduce milk purchases 
due to the MAP information.  
Hypothesis 5 tests the effect of the perception that foodborne epidemics are difficult to control in 
treatment 1. To measure that perception, we used the level of agreement to the following statements: 
The government can cope with a disease outbreak effectively, food borne epidemics requiring 
government intervention are increasing, a food borne epidemic requiring government intervention is 
difficult to control, food producers can cope with a disease outbreak effectively, and a food borne 
epidemic requiring government intervention would affect my food purchases. We also asked if they have 
experienced a food borne epidemic. Consumer risk perceptions on food has been found to depend on 
their personal and indirect food safety experiences (Tonsor et al., 2009). The correlation among these 
variables ranged from 0.21 to 0.62.  
Believing that government and producers can cope with a food borne epidemic decreases the effect of 
treatment 1. Only the effect of believing that the government can cope with a food born e epidemic is 
significant; those responding positively to that question are 10% less likely to be affected by treatment 1 
(p-value of 0.03), although they are still less likely to purchase milk. Believing that food borne epidemics 
are increasing, and that a food born epidemic would affect their purchases, have a positive effect in 
treatment 1. These variables correlate with 8% and 12% increase in probability of being affected by 
treatment 1. We tested if having experience an epidemic affects the reaction to  treatment 1. We asked 
participants whether they experienced an epidemic, like the H1N1 epidemic, and found that experiencing 
an epidemic like the H1N1 does not have any effect in treatment 1.  
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Hypothesis 6 tests whether being familiar with Crohn’s disease,  or also if knowing a person affected by 
Crohn’s disease, increases the probability of being affected by treatment 1. In our survey, no one 
answered that they were familiar with Crohn’s disease before this survey, despite people answering that 
they know someone with Crohn’s disease. Thus, we only tested the second statement, knowing a person 
affected by Crohn’s disease. We found that people who know anyone who suffers from Crohn’s disease 
are 7% less likely to be affected by treatment 1. That is, they are less likely of decreasing milk purchases 
due to MAP in milk. 
A summary of the results of the hypotheses 3-6 (H3-H6) are shown in Table 3. 
Table 3. 
 Marginal effects of the variables of the hypotheses tested for treatment 1. 
  H3  H4  H5  H6  
  TrustGvmt -0.015 LocalFarm -0.042 GvmtCope -0.108** KnowPat -0.076* 
 (0.754)  (0.356)  (0.034)  (0.069) 
  TrustNews -0.019 Organic -0.083*** ProdCope -0.031   
 (0.644)  (0.000)  (0.546)   
  Pasteur 0.288* FEpiIncr 0.081*   
   (0.100)  (0.051)   
    FEpiDCont 0.028   
     (0.506)   
    FEpiAffPur 0.123**   
     (0.018)   
    FEpiExper 0.018   
     (0.714)   
Results are marginal effects of a logistic model. P-values in parenthesis. Significance: *** .01, ** .05, * .10. Marginal effects were 
estimated at the mean values and represent changes in probability of decreasing milk purchases due to treatment 1. The column 
names starting with an H refers to the hypothesis number. The variables of each model are described in the hypothesis section 
and the section above. TrustGvmt, trust the government; TrustNews, trust a news source (TV/Radio, newspaper, online news); 
LocalFarm, prefer products from local farms; Organic, prefer organic products; Pasteur, agree that pasteurization is important for 
healthy milk; GvmtCope, agree that government can cope effectively with a food borne epidemic; ProdCope, agree that food 
producers can cope effectively with a food borne epidemic; FEpiIncr, agree that food borne epidemics are increasing; FEpiDCont, 
agree that food borne epidemics are difficult to control; FEpiAffPur, agree that food borne epidemics may affect their food 
purchases; FEpiExper, have experience food borne epidemics in the past; KnowPat, know a person with Crohn’s disease. 
4.4 Factors affecting the second treatment 
Hypotheses seven and eight (H7, H8) test various factors that may affect the likelihood that a person 
responds positively to government controls to eliminate MAP from the milk supply in the U.S. Similar to 
the hypotheses testing for the first treatment, the variables used to measure and test a hypothesis is 
interacted with the treatment effect on the treated for the second treatment. The results of testing H7 
and H8 are shown in Table 4. 
Hypothesis 7 states that trust in government (local government and Health Depa rtment) and dairy 
producers does not have an effect in treatment 2. The measure of local government trust is the same 
used in the hypothesis 3; trust in the Health Department and in dairy producers is measured in the same 
way from the survey response. We found that trust has no effect in returning to pre-MAP levels of milk 
purchases after government intervention. However, we found significant effects for not restoring milk 
purchases to original levels when individuals are self-described as liberals. They are 21% more likely, 
compared to the people that do not described themselves as either liberal or conservative, of not 
responding to the government interventions to eliminate MAP from the milk supply. Being self -described 
as conservative has no statistically significant effect. 
Hypothesis 8 tests the effect of the perception that food borne epidemics are difficult to control. The 
result of this test was not statistically significant.  
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Table 4. 
Marginal effects of the variables of the hypotheses tested for treatment 2. 
H7  H8  
TrustGvmt -0.027 FEpiDiffContr -0.042 
 (0.720)  (0.739) 
TrustHealthD  0.0512   
 (0.511)   
TrustFarmers -0.053   
 (0.525)   
Conservative 0.059   
 (0.443)   
Liberal 0.218***   
 (0.006)   
Results are marginal effects of a logistic model. P-values in parenthesis. Significance: *** .01, ** .05, * .10. Marginal effects 
were estimated at the mean values and represent changes in probability of decreasing milk purchases due to treatment 1. 
The column names, with prefix H, refers to the hypothesis number. The variables of each model are described in the 
hypothesis section and the previous section. TrustGvmt, trust in government; TrustHealthD, trust in the Health 
Department; TrustFarmers, trust in farmers; Conservative, identified as a conservative political ideologist; Liberal, identified 
as a liberal political ideologist. FEpiDCont, agree that food borne epidemics are difficult to control 
4.5 Welfare effects  
The welfare effects of the public response to the information about MAP in the milk supply and on the 
subsequent government control to eliminate MAP from the milk supply are presented in this section 
following a partial equilibrium model for the dairy market in the U.S.  
Consumers who withdrew milk consumption due to the effect of MAP information may seek milk 
substitites, thus restoring some but not all of the consumer surplus, or they would consume the 
substitute over milk initially. Our analysis focuses on the losses in the dairy market alone, thus a partial 
equilibrium model is warranted.   
This welfare analysis is divided in two parts. First, we estimated the change in consumer and producer 
surplus from the shift in demand of fluid milk caused by the first intervention. Fluid milk marketed is 
estimated to represent 23% of total milk marketed (USDA:ERS, 2020a). We calculated that 19.6% of 
consumers would stop consuming fluid milk after the first intervention. We found that widespread news 
of MAP in the milk supply decreases the equilibrium quantity of milk by 2.16% to 94.078 billion k g of milk. 
This shift in demand would decrease the average price of milk received by 4.07%, with the resulting 
equilibrium price of $0.387/ kg. Change in consumer surplus and producer surplus were estimated at -
$1,403 million and -$1,562 million, respectively. Total welfare effect from the decrease in fluid milk 
demand was estimated at -$2,966 million. 
The second part of the welfare analysis looks at the change in fluid milk demand resulting from the 
government control. The government control was modeled as a test and cull program for all dairy cows. 
We assumed that the government compensates farmers for every culled cow in the program. The culling 
of cows will decrease milk supply by an amount equals to the number of culled cows times the average 
milk production of a MAP infected cow. The MAP test and cull program was assumed to have a specificity 
of 1 (Verteramo Chiu et al., 2018), thus, no culling of healthy cows is expected. MAP elimination in a herd 
by test and cull controls is unfeasible. A reduction of  MAP infected cows to 3% is possible with test and 
cull controls, and with this percentage of infected cows in a herd, the amount of MAP in the herd’s milk 
tank becomes undetectable. Reducing the number of infected MAP cows from 12% to 3%, in a 9.34 
million cow population requires testing all cows at a cost of $42 per cow and culling 840 thousand cows. 
The total cost of implementing the program was estimated at $897 million, out of which $392 million is 
the cost of testing for MAP and $504 million is the compensation given to producers for culling MAP 
positive cows. These costs are conservative since they do not include other costs like production loss and 
veterinary salaries, among others. The MAP control program is expected to reduce national milk supply 
by 10.6 billion kg, or 11% of the equilibrium quantity after the first intervention. This shifts the supply 
curve to the left, setting the new equilibrium price and quantity to $0.427/ kg and 88.6 billion kg, 
respectively. Changes in consumer and producer surpluses after the second intervention from the initial 
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equilibrium state were estimated at -$4,942 million and -$4,998 million, respectively, with a total welfare 
change of -$9,940 million from the initial state. Summary of the welfare effects when only demand for 
milk is assumed to decrease are shown in Table A3 in the appendix. 
Consumers who stated withdrawal from fluid milk consumption may also stop consuming dairy products 
in general for fear of infection, since consumers were informed that pasteurizat ion does not eliminate 
MAP from milk. We thus calculated welfare changes if consumers who indicated they would cease 
consuming fluid milk would stop consuming all dairy products.  
In this scenario, we estimated that demand curve for all marketed milk would shift to the left by 19.6% of 
consumption at the initial state. After the first intervention, the equilibrium price and quantity are 
estimated to decrease by 17.5% and 9.28%, respectively, with a welfare loss estimated at $12,278 million. 
After the second intervention, equilibrium price and quantity were 6.77% and 14.57%, respectively, lower 
than the initial case. Changes in consumer and producer surpluses after the second intervention from the 
initial equilibrium state were estimated at -$8,873 million and -$9,374 million, respectively, with a total 
welfare change of -$18,247 million from the initial state. Results are shown in Table 5.  
Table 5. 
Welfare effects of the interventions. Demand for all dairy products (fluid milk and processed milk products) are assumed to 
decrease in the same proportion as fluid milk. 
 Initial state First Intervention Second Intervention 
Equilibrium Price ($/kg) 0.403 0.333 0.376 
Equilibrium Quantity (mill. kg) 96,155 87,237 82,147 
Consumer Surplusa 32,845 27,035 23,972 
Producer Surplusa 36,564 30,096 27,190 
Welfare Change from Initial Statea - -12,278 -18,247 
Government Cost - - 897 
a in millions of dollars. Price is at farmgate, quantity is total milk production. First intervention refers to the shift in demand 
of all marketed milk due to MAP information. Second intervention refers to the government program to control MAP and 
its effect in partially restoring lost demand. Producer surplus in the second intervention includes a $504 million transfer to 
producers as part of the government control program. Government cost is the cost of implementing the control program: 
testing costs plus transfer to producers. 
 
A sensitivity analysis of the results is presented in the appendix.   
4.6 Limitations of the study 
This study has several limitations. The data were obtained from an online survey distributed to a random 
sample of the U.S. population. This sample, although demographically similar to that of the U.S. 
population, may not be representative. The people sampled in this survey  are part of a list of survey 
takers of Qualtrics, which may result in selection bias. Realistically, it is difficult to eliminate this potential 
problem from mail or online surveys. Second, in all surveys it is difficult to assess the veracity of the 
answers, which may not reflect participants’ actual behaviors. We included several questions in the 
survey aimed at filtering out nonsensical responses, including a filter that discards surveys that took a 
very short time to complete. These filters and quality checks resulted in 23% of the responses meeting 
the quality standards, the rest were discarded.  
5 Conclusion 
We estimated the welfare effects of a food shock in the U.S. milk market caused by dissemination of 
information on Mycobacterium avium sub. paratuberculosis (MAP) present in the milk supply and its 
presumed association with Crohn’s disease in humans. We surveyed, via the online survey platform 
Qualtrics, 604 regular milk drinkers above 21 years old that participate in their households’ milk purchas e 
decision. We did a difference-in-difference analysis of the effects of willingness to purchase milk on the 
information of MAP in the milk supply, as well as of the effect of a government program to eliminate MAP 
from the milk supply.  
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Our results show that about 19.6% (p-value < 0.001) of the people exposed to the MAP information 
would stop purchasing fluid milk at current market prices, and that 5% (p-value < 0.21) of those people 
would return to their initial milk purchasing levels under a government control to eliminate MAP from the 
milk supply.  
The decrease in consumer and producer welfare caused by the food shock  affecting all milk demand (fluid 
and processed milk) and the subsequent government control program was estimated to be $18.247 
billion. The MAP control program cost was estimated at $897 million. However, if the food shock only 
affects the fluid milk market, the welfare cost was estimated at $9.94 billion. Under the scenario of a 
more elastic demand and supply of milk, welfare losses were considerable smaller at $8,760 and $5,233, 
when the food shock affects all dairy products demand and fluid milk only, respectively. Welfare losses 
can represent a substantial share of the market value of milk production in the U.S., estimated at $38.7 
billion. Welfare losses to a potential MAP food scare can be substantial.    
We analyzed factors that may affect consumer response to the food shock  and to the control program. 
We found that males and younger consumers are less likely to reduce milk purchases due to a food shock 
of MAP in milk; but low-income consumers are more likely to reduce milk purchases. However, from 
those who decrease milk purchases due to the information about MAP in milk, males are more likely to 
restore their initial milk purchases after a government control program to eliminate MAP in the milk 
supply is in effect.  
Consumers that believe the government can cope with a food-borne epidemic effectively are less likely to 
respond negatively to a food shock, but consumers that believe food-borne epidemics are increasing are 
more likely to decrease purchases of milk due to MAP information. Consumers that prefer organic milk 
are less likely to reduce their milk purchases from a food shock. The same is true for people that know 
someone who has Crohn’s disease: they will not reduce their milk purchases compared to someone that 
doesn’t know anyone with Crohn’s disease.  
People who described themselves as liberals are more likely to not respond positively to a government 
MAP elimination program. Their milk purchasing levels would not return to their initial levels despite 
MAP being eliminated from the milk supply.  
This study shows that consumers may reduce their consumption levels of a food when information on a 
potential pathogen present in the food is disseminated, even though it is explicit that there is no scientific 
evidence that the pathogen can affect humans. We also found that government responses to a food born 
epidemic may not be effective in restoring consumption to pre-epidemic levels, at least in the short run.  
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Appendix 
1 Survey questions 
Two WTP questions are asked, one after each intervention. The information on the first intervention (I 1) 
was identical for the TC and TT groups, but different for the CC group. For I 1, the information for all 
groups is shown next3. 
Control (CC) and Treatment (TC, TT) 
The average cow in the U.S. produces about 23,000 lbs of milk per lactation (milk producing period).  
Lactation occurs after a cow gives birth to a calf, and lasts about 305 days. The gestation per iod of a cow 
is 9 months. 
Dairy cows can weigh about 1,500 pounds. There are many dairy breeds in the U.S., but Holstein cows 
make about 90% of all dairy cows. 
 
The following information was shown to the treatment group for I 1. 
Treatment (TC, TT) 
MAP (Mycobacterium avium subs. paratuberculosis) is a bacteria that causes a non-treatable disease in 
ruminants (cows) that affects their lower intestines, resulting in weight and milk production loss and 
eventually death. 
A similar disease in humans is called Crohn's disease. 
According to the Mayo Clinic: 
"Crohn's disease is an inflammatory bowel disease. It causes inflammation of your digestive tract, which 
can lead to abdominal pain, severe diarrhea, fatigue, weight loss and malnutrition . 
The inflammation caused by Crohn's disease often spreads deep into the layers of affected bowel tissue.  
Crohn's disease can be both painful and debilitating, and sometimes may lead to life-threatening 
complications." 
Currently, there is no cure for Crohn's disease. 
Although some studies suggest a relationship between MAP and Crohn's disease through milk 
contaminated with MAP, this relationship has not been proven. 
It is estimated that 5% of the cows in the U.S. are infected with MAP,  
and about 30% of the milk  sold in the U.S. (of all varieties) contains MAP. 
Pasteurization may not eliminate MAP from milk.  
 
                                                 
3 The information was shown to U.S. milk consumers; thus, it is shown in pounds. Average milk production per cow in the 
U.S. is about 10,430 kg per lactation. Dairy cows can weigh about 680 kg.  
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The information shown on the second intervention (I2) was the same for the CC and TC groups, but 
different for the TT group. For I2, the following information was shown to all groups. 
Control (CC, TC) and Treatment (TT) 
The top five milk producing states are: California, Wisconsin, Idaho, New York, and Texas. Together they 
account for over 50% of the total U.S. milk production.  
Most milk produced in the U.S. comes from commercial farms, following USDA's strict regulations. 
 
The following information was shown for the treatment group for I 2. 
Treatment (TT) 
If a link between MAP and Crohn's disease is established, the government can establish procedures to 
reduce MAP-contaminated milk in the food supply.  
These actions include better and more frequent testing of farms, dairy animals, milk tanks, and 
processing facilities.  
MAP-positive animals can be identified and culled, and the infected farms are monitored until no MAP is 
found on those farms. 
The government would assure that under these procedures, the risk of drinking MAP-contaminated milk 
and getting Crohn's disease is highly unlikely. 
Health agencies and non-government organizations support these claims. 
 
In all three survey versions, after the information corresponding to each group was presented, the 
following question on willingness to purchase milk was asked. 
After reading the previous information, would you continue to buy or reduce your purchases of the milk 
of your choice (cow's milk of any fat content, including lactose free and flavored milk) that is normally 
consumed in your household at current prices? 
Important information was shown in bold.  
2 Econometric model 
Data are organized in two repeated cross sections, one observation for each intervention. Since the 
dependent value is (1, 0), the DID effects are estimated using a logit model. The probability of observing a 
decrease in WTP after each intervention is,  
    (1) 
 
Where  is the probability that individual  chooses to decrease milk purchases conditional on being 
in intervention  and group , = 1, 2. In equation (1),  and  are two vectors indicating if an 
individual  is part of the treatment group of the first and second intervention, respectively. The 
groups in the first treatment are TT and TC, while the group in the second treatment is TT. I1 and I2 
are indicator vectors for the first and second treatment, respectively. 
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The natural log of the odds ratio results in the logit model 
 
       (2) 
 
The output, , is the log of the odds ratio, and  is the error term vector distributed 
. The coefficients to estimate are the , which change the log odds ratio. The effect of 
the first and second treatment are  and , respectively.  
 
The coefficient  measures the change in output of the control group at the first intervention, 
.  
 measures the change in output of the treatment group at the first intervention, 
.  
 measures the change in output for the control group at the second intervention, T2. 
.  
 measures the change in output of the treatment group at the second intervention,  
.     
The hypotheses H0:  = 0 and H0:  = 0, capture the effect of the first and second treatments, 
respectively. 
 
The next step in our analysis was to estimate the effects of factors affecting the conditional 
probability of changes in WTP milk for each of the treated groups (  and ) at each treatment (  
and . Similar to (1), we include matrices of covariates,  and , interacting with each of the 
interactions of (  and ( , respectively. Matrices  and  are not identical, they 
include specific variables that were tested for each treatment effect on the treated. The variables 
included in each matrix were based on hypotheses described in another section. Description of the 
variables of each matrix is shown in Table A2. The conditional probability of reducing WTP milk 
conditional on the covariates for each treatment is 
  (3) 
 
The resulting logit model is 
 
  (4) 
 
The effects of the covariates in  and  were estimated by the vectors of coefficients  and , 
respectively.  
3 Hypotheses 
This section lists the hypotheses tested in our study. Hypotheses H1 and H2 were tested from the DID 
regression (1). Hypotheses H3 through H9 were tested from equation (3). The variables used to test the 
hypotheses were obtained from the survey. Some of these variables are the result of the level of 
agreement with certain statements. Responses were given over a Likert -type scale, where the values 
ranged from 1 to 5, indicating level of agreement with the statement.   
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H1: milk consumers exposed to information on MAP in the milk supply and the current understanding of 
its association with Crohn’s disease will not change their willingness to purchase milk. 
One of the main hypotheses to test is whether information on MAP in the milk supply changes 
consumers’ WTP milk. The information on MAP and Crohn’s disease may trigger fear on consumers, 
potentially creating a food shock. Consumers may be unwilling to take the risk of drinking MAP 
contaminated milk. This is captured by the parameter . We expect the value of  to be positive.  
H2: milk consumers that decrease their willingness to purchase milk due to t reatment 1 (information on 
MAP in the milk supply) will not increase their willingness to purchase milk after exposed to information 
on policies that minimize the risk of MAP in milk.  
During a food shock caused by information on MAP in the milk supply, the government may enforce 
policies aimed at minimizing MAP in the milk supply chain, and potentially eliminating MAP from the milk 
supply chain, to restore consumers’ confidence. The effect of these policies on changes in consumers’ 
WTP milk is captured by the parameter . If the policy is deemed as sufficient to reduce the risk of MAP 
contamination, consumers may increase their WTP milk. We expect the value of  to be negative.  
The following hypotheses H3-H6 are estimated for intervention 1 (I1). 
H3: trust in mass media or the government is not correlated with the probability of decreasing milk 
purchase intent due to MAP information. 
Information on MAP through mass media, or any information source, may have a lower effect in 
decreasing WTP milk if consumers have little trust in the source of information. Skeptical consumers may 
underestimate the degree of urgency that media conveys. This hypothesis was tested with the variable 
TrustNews. This variable includes responses to trust of newspapers, TV/radio, and internet sources. To 
test the effect of trust on government information alone we used the variable TrustGvmt, which does not 
include the variables in TrustNews. The value of these variables are 0 and 1, where 1 indicates trust in the  
information source and is recorded when the individual states that they trust an information source 
included in the variable completely or somewhat.  We expect a positive effect of these variables.  
H4: preference for milk production processes is not correlated with the probability of decreasing milk 
purchase intent due to MAP information. 
Consumers that care about how the milk they drink is produced may pay more attention to the 
information related to milk process, and thus may be more responsive to the MAP information in milk. 
We used the responses on agreement of three statements on preference in milk production: local milk, 
organic milk, and knowing that pasteurization is important for healthy milk. These results were captured 
by the binary variables LocalFarm, Organic, and Paster, respectively. We expect the coefficient of these 
variables to be positive. The correlation among these variables was 0.26 for Organic and LocalFarm, 0.17 
for Paster and LocalFarm, and -0.02 for Paster and Organic.  
H5: perception that food borne epidemics are increasing and difficult to control is not correlated to the 
probability of decreasing milk purchase intent due to MAP information. 
Knowing that MAP is prevalent in the milk supply may lead people to anticipate a food born e epidemic 
requiring intervention. People that believe this type of epidemic is increasing and difficult to control may 
be more likely to respond to MAP information by decreasing purchase intent. The variables FEpiIncr, 
FEpiDCont, FEpiAffPur, indicate agreement that food borne epidemics are increasing, are difficult to 
control, and can affect their food purchases. The variable FEpiExper indicates if an individual has 
experienced food borne epidemics before. We expect the coefficient of these variables to be  positive. 
The variables GvmtCope and ProdCope, indicate whether individuals trust that government or milk 
producers can cope with a food borne epidemic effectively. We expect the coefficient of these variables 
to be negative. All variables take value 1 or 0 if they agree to the statement or not.  
H6: familiarity with Crohn’s disease is not correlated with the probability of decreasing milk purchase 
intent due to MAP information. 
The information on MAP in the milk supply also states the potential association with Crohn’s disease, 
although non-confirmed by the scientific community. People that are familiar with Crohn’s disease are 
believed to be more likely to react to MAP information because they may know that this disease is non -
curable and potentially fatal. We included a question that ask if an individual knows anyone with Crohn’s 
disease, the response is captured in the variable KnowPat. We expect this coefficient to be positive.  
The following hypotheses were estimated for intervention 2 ( I2). 
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H7: trust in government and in dairy farmers is not correlated with the probability of increasing milk 
consumption due to information on the MAP elimination policy. 
The perception of the success of government’s policies to eliminate a national food borne epidemic are  
important in restoring confidence. People who have trust in the government may be more likely to 
increase their WTP milk after a government intervention than people who do not trust the government. 
This is captured in the variables TrustGvmt and TrustHealthD (trust in the Health Department). We expect 
parameters on these coefficients to be positive. Similarly, the success of a MAP elimination policy may be 
perceived as how much dairy farmers contribute to solve this problem. Dairy farmers contribute direct ly 
in eliminating MAP from the milk supply. Trust in dairy farmers may cause consumers to increase milk 
purchases after an eradication policy. This was tested with the variable TrustFarmers, which asks the level 
of trust in dairy farmers. We expected this coefficient to be positive. In addition, political ideology may 
also affect the perception of benefits of government programs; especially if the ruling government is of a 
different ideology. This is consistent with partisan identity, where individuals may adjust their opinions to 
be consistent, and loyal, with that of the party they are affiliated (Dancey and Goren, 2010; Druckman et 
al., 2013; Lavine et al., 2012). The variables Conservative and Liberal are dummy variables that indicate 
political ideology, or affiliation. We expect that people with ideologies similar to that of the current 
government to be more likely to trust government policies. 
H8: perception that food borne epidemics are difficult to control is not correlated to the probability of 
increasing milk consumption due to information on the MAP elimination policy.  
The perception that food borne epidemics are difficult to control is hypothesized to be negatively related 
to increasing milk purchases after a MAP elimination policy. This factor was measured by the variable 
FEpiDiffContr which is the belief that food borne epidemics are difficult to control. The variable takes 
value 1 if the feeling is that these epidemics are difficult to control, and 0 otherwise. We expect the 
coefficient of this variable to be positive. 
4 Tables  
Table A1. 
Parameter values used in the welfare analysis 
Parameter Description  Value  Source 
 Demand elasticity of milk -0.59 Andreyeva et al. (2010) 
 Supply elasticity of milk 0.53 Bozic et al. (2012) 
  Intercept of demand function 152,887 Estimated  
  Intercept of supply function 45,192 Estimated  
 Slope of demand function -140,747 Estimated 
 Slope of supply function 126,433 Estimated 
Q0 Milk production (million kg) 96,155 USDA:ERS (2020a) 
P0 Milk price ($/kg) 0.403 USDA:NASS (2020) 
- Milk production per cow/year (kg) 10,295 USDA:ERS (2020b) 
- Milk production per infected cow/year (kg) 9,420 Estimated from Smith et al., (2016) 
- Number of dairy cows in the U.S. (million) 9.34 USDA:ERS (2020b) 
- Culled price of MAP infected cow ($) 600 USDA:NASS (2017) 
- Cost of MAP tests ($ per cow) 42 Verteramo Chiu et al. (2018) 
Changes in consumer surplus were calculated by the inverse demand function,  , and for supply as 
. The change in consumer surplus is , where the consumer surplus is 
. Similarly, the change in producer surplus is . The producer surplus is 
. Total welfare change is . 
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Table A2. 
Demographic Characteristics of Survey Participants and National Average for Comparison. 
Variable CC TC TT All Groups National Average* 
Observations 202 200 202 604 N/A 
Male (%) 0.26 0.64 0.61 0.50 0.50 
Age (years, mean) 41 46 46 44 35a 
Education (%) 
     
High School or Less 0.38 0.30 0.35 0.34 0.56b 
Associate Degree 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.10 
Undergraduate Degree 0.26 0.35 0.31 0.31 0.21 
Postgraduate Degree 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.13 
Household Income (%) 
     
< $25k 0.20 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.18 
$25-$50k 0.19 0.25 0.22 0.22 0.22 
$50-$75k 0.14 0.22 0.21 0.19 0.19 
$75-$100k 0.07 0.15 0.16 0.13 0.14 
$100-$150k 0.18 0.13 0.15 0.15 0.15 
> $150k 0.20 0.08 0.09 0.13 0.12 
Race (%) 
     
Non-Hispanic White 0.43 0.73 0.72 0.63 0.60 
Hispanic 0.27 0.11 0.13 0.17 0.18 
Asian 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.06 
Non-Hispanic Black 0.21 0.09 0.09 0.13 0.13 
American Indian or Alaskan 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 
Other 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 
Political Affiliation (%) 
     
Conservative 0.27 0.35 0.33 0.32 0.36 
Liberal 0.28 0.24 0.20 0.24 0.25 
Middle-of-the-road 0.38 0.37 0.44 0.40 N/A 
Other 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.05 N/A 
Values as proportion of the group or population. * United States Census Bureau. a median age. b includes some college 
education but no college degree.  N/A, not applicable. 
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Table A3. 
Welfare effects of the interventions when only demand for fluid milk is assumed to decrease. 
 Initial state First Intervention Second Intervention 
Equilibrium Price ($/kg) 0.403 0.387 0.427 
Equilibrium Quantity (mill. kg) 96,155 94,078 88,626 
Consumer Surplusa 32,845 31,442 27,903 
Producer Surplusa 36,564 35,002 31,566 
Welfare Change from Initial Statea - -2,966 -9,940 
Government Cost - - 897 
a in millions of dollars. Price is at farmgate, quantity is total milk production. First intervention refers to the shift in demand 
of fluid milk due to MAP information. Second intervention refers to the government program to control MAP and its effect 
in partially restoring lost demand. Producer surplus in the second intervention includes a $504 million transfer to 
producers as part of the government control program. Government cost is the cost of implementing the control program: 
testing costs plus transfer to producers.  
5 Sensitivity analysis 
We further estimated the welfare effects under a set of supply and demand elasticities that are more 
elastic than the previous results. Also, the effect of the government program in milk supply depends on 
the elimination time of the program. When the effects of a program are expected over a longer term, the 
shape of the supply and demand curves should reflect that time horizon (Just, Hueth, and Schmitz, 1982). 
We estimated the welfare changes after the both interventions for changes in fluid milk demand as well 
as for changes in all marketed milk. We used the more elastic demand and supply elasticities values of -
1.39 (Davis et al., 2012) and 0.89 (Bozic et al., 2012), respectively. In the initial case, equilibrium price and 
quantity remain the same as in the previous analysis ($0.403/ kg and 96,155 million kg), but the initial 
consumer and producer surplus are now $13,942 million and $21,774 million, respectively. The results of 
changes in demand for fluid milk only and for all dairy products under larger elasticity values are shown in 
Table A4. 
Table A4. 
Welfare effects of the interventions for decrease in demand for fluid milk and all dairy products, under larger elasticity 
values. 





First Intervention Second Intervention 
Equilibrium Price ($/kg) 0.395 0.415 0.368 0.390 
Equilibrium Quantity (mill. kg) 94,442 88,095 88,798 82,751 
Consumer Surplusa 13,449 11,702 11,890 10,325 
Producer Surplusa 21,005 18,781 18,570 16,630 
Welfare Change from Initial Statea -1,261 -5,233 -5,256 -8,760 
a in millions of dollars. Price is at farmgate, quantity is total milk production. First intervention refers to the shift in demand 
of milk, as described in the column, due to MAP information. Second intervention refers to the government program to 
control MAP and its effect in partially restoring lost demand. Producer surplus in the second intervention includes a $504 
million transfer to producers as part of the government control program. The cost of implementing the control program is 
$897 million. 
 
The welfare losses under the scenario of larger demand and supply elasticity are significantly lower than 
the baseline scenario. This is expected since larger elasticities implies that consumers and producers are 
better able to accommodate the effect of price changes with substitutes in consumption and 
technologies. This may also occur when looking at market response in the long run.   
 
